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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH * 
* 
Plaintiff/Appellee * 
vs. * Appellate Case No. 20080243-CA 
LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN, JR * 
Defendant / Appellant * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the District Court's wrongfully accepting the 
defendant's plea, the denial of the defendant's withdrawal of his plea, the failure 
of the court to allow the defendant time to make restitution and the length of his 
sentence. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I. DID THE COURT ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE RESITUTION IN 
ORDER FOR THE CASE TO BE DISMISSED. Standard of Review: Abuse 
of discretion. See State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
ISSUE II. DID THE STATE FAIL TO PRESENT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. Standard of Review for the trial 
court's ruling regarding substantial compliance with constitutional and 
procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. See Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 
1992); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE III. THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT. Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial 
court abused its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to prison.. UA sentence 
will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion, failed 
to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." 
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 4546 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.C.A. THEFT BY DECEPTION 76-6-405 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
(2) Theft by Deception does not occur, however, when there is only 
falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by 
statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in 
communications addressed to the public or to a class or group. 
Rule 11 Pleas 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open 
court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant 
has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in 
the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a 
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to 
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
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(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall 
forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be 
given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the 
court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty 
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to 
compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the 
plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise 
unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence 
to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
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(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court 
has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged 
the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required 
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a 
plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for 
extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally 
ill to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code 
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in 
writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant 
to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure 
to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for 
withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser 
included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall 
be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court. 
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(i)( i) i ne judge shall i lot participate in plea discussion . 
plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(\)(2) When a tentative plea agreenieir has been reached, the jiakv pon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of ihe tentative 
agreement and the reasons tbi i : •= advance ofthe time for tender o! 
the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition w ill be approved. 
(i)(J) ii in*, judge then decides that imai uispositioii silould not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call :r the defendant to either nHn- ^ -> rKimu the p!o-> 
VJ) V\ ith approxal ofthe court and the consent ofthe prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilt} ..UKI mentally 
ill. or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of ihe adverse determination of any specified 
pre-trial moiion \ defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea.. 
(iv) w lien a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and ineniuii) in n 
addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a 
hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is 
mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record 
as a whole. An\ \ariance from the procedures required, by this n tie whicl l 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to 
comply with this rule is not. by itself, sufficient grounds for a 
collateral attnek *>n i - -<'\4\ plea. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1 vv.>. juhuau ,. , -; .o. .VM embei ». • 
November 1. 2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005: November 
2005, Amended January 14, 2008, Effective January 1, 2008.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
The appellant was charged by way of information with eleven counts of 
Theft by Deception. R. 001. He entered an Alford type guilty plea on May 14, 
2007. R. 031. The State set forth the factual basis to support the charges. R. 104. 
The plea was a conditional plea in which the defendant would be able to withdraw 
his guilty plea upon the payment of restitution and the charges would be 
dismissed. R. 031. 
The defendant was serving a sentence at the Utah State Prison when he 
entered his plea and was unable to be released from the Department of 
Correction's custody in order for him to access the funds in which to make 
restitution. Prior to the defendants sentencing counsel made a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. The court denied the motion R. 107. The trial court denied the 
motions. R. 107. The defendant was sentenced on February 5, 2008. R. 086. The 
court sentenced the defendant to 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison on all 
eleven counts. He ordered that counts 1 through 3 to run consecutive to counts 4 
through 7 and counts 8 through 11 will run consecutively to those charges. R. 086, 
B. Statement of Facts 
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U -1 
I (ah. a Mr. Richard \\ ater^ transferred money to the defendant totaling 
,
 s . i in (\(\(\ n, tii >p ; :r- p *n6 p 3 r\liese monies were transferred lor a 
Dunn acknowledged that he received these amounts , k . iu4 i-. o. 
That subsequent ly, some several months latei. " '•-;. Waters made several 
i • * : AL. and ;,u viclenc.ant was 
not able lo return the mono} because ol m^ incao cm; 
The State proffered certain facts thai if ihe ease were to proceed lo .i .ah 
t .. • i. • * were used inconsistent to the purpose that 
the\ were given to Mi . Uuini. there! ^ -' >1 
over the funds, R. 104 P S The i\\o\\'\ was given lo Mi'. Dunn ;.;. v. 
h . • . r.ul some olnei ;nii i ;^. i . - support of the 
e lements of the ease, the ^i.r " *••• 
records, to show that the monies were used inconsistent lor the purpose 
it was gi\ v ! 
Mr. Dunn did not agree w " ' ' . • ' . -
the guih> plea. ! *'• Me plead guilty on a,tlf:ord type basis iii an 
aucmpi io L:CI w,; *., ,.,,, , ,,c delendant was on probat ion in Salt Lake 
C o 11111 \ \ \ hen ill i" 11i," 111 J 11 it I I n i 1111. • in 11111 \ • 1IN mad i" I { I (11 !" '" I"! e I * \1 e 
he could access the funds, his probat ion w as revoked and was 
incarcerated in the I Itah State Prison. R 104 P. 9. 
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4. Mr. Dunn plead guilty to eleven counts of Theft by Deception, all 
second degree felonies. He plead guilty on the basis the Court would 
release him on his own recognizance pending sentencing and the State 
of Utah would write a letter to the Board of Pardons asking for his 
release. R. 36. The defendant agreed to deposit $1,300,000.00 into the 
Trust account of his defense attorney, within 90 days of entering the 
guilty pleas and being released from the Utah State Prison. R. 36. 
5. He further agreed to turn his passport over to his attorney and not leave 
the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from his 
probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case. R. 36. 
6. Mr. Dunn agreed to deposit $1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust 
account of his defense attorney, within 90 days of entering the guilty 
pleas in this case and being released from the Utah State Prison. The 
money was to be paid to Richard Waters to compensate him for the 
monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to him during the years 2004 
and 2005. The State agreed once it had reasonably verified that Mr. 
Waters has received the $1,300,000.00 in legal funds, they would 
stipulate to withdrawing his plea to the eleven counts and dismiss the 
charges against him. R. 36 The written plea agreement did not set forth 
the factual basis for the pleas. It made reference to the facts the 
prosecutor would state in open court during the plea hearing. R. 32. 
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On August 20, 2007, a status conference was held in the First District 
Court. Mr. Dunn had not been released from the Utah State Prison and 
the mattered was continued until November, 19th 2007. The court date 
was changed to November 26, 2007. R. 50. The defendant failed to 
appear for court on November 26, 2007 and a warrant for $20,000.00 
dollars was issued on December 4, 2007. R. 55. 
On January 14, 2008, the defendant appeared for sentencing and a 
motion was made to continue the sentencing for another sixty (60) days. 
The defendant was sure he could access the money and pay Mr. Waters 
within that time. The court continued sentencing until February 11, 
2008. R. 106 P. 4. The defendant is in custody of the Department of 
Corrections at the Utah State Prison. 
On February 25, 2008, the defendant appeared for sentencing. His 
attorney made a motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty pleas. R. 107 
P.2. He also asks the Court for additional time for the defendant to read 
his pre-sentence report. The court denies all motions and requests. R. 
107 P. 4. The court sentences the defendant to serve, One to fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison on each of the counts. He was ordered to 
pay a fine on each count of $1,500.00 and pay restitution in the amount 
of $1,149,175.00. plus interest. The court ran counts one through three 
consecutively. Counts four through seven consecutively and counts 
eight through eleven consecutively. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant/appellant alleges on appeal he should have been given more 
time to get the funds sought for by the State in behalf of Mr. Richard Waters. 
Because of his confinement in the Utah State Prison he was never given the 
opportunity to access the funds transferred to him and return them to Mr. Waters. 
He further alleges that the State failed to set forth a proper factual basis to 
support the alford pleas that he entered and that the court did not strictly comply 
with Rule 11. The plea affidavit did not contain the elements of the crime and the 
court did not explain them to the defendant. 
He further alleges that his guilty pleas that the court should have allowed 
his guilty plea be withdraw. 
Finally, the defendant asserts that the courts imposition of consecutive 
sentences was cruel and unusual punishment. 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I. DID THE COURT ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE RESITUTION IN 
ORDER FOR THE CASE TO BE DISMISSED 
Mr. Dunn, the appellant entered into an unusual plea agreement with 
the State of Utah. He entered Alford pleas to the Eleven counts of Theft by 
Deception against him. The only consideration he received in return was the 
State agreed to allow him to withdraw his plea upon the payment of full 
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restitution. The State did not dismiss any of the Counts or reduce their 
severity. 
The defendant in essence entered in a contract with the State if Utah and 
the Court to repay the restitution owing to Mr. Waters. The defendant was unable 
to perform on the contract. Mr. Waters continued incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison prohibited him from obtaining access to the funds to re-pay them to Mr. 
Waters, thus it was impossible for him to perform on the contract. 
In State v. Stringham, 17 P.3d 1153 (Utah) suggests that an agreement 
just between the State and the defendant is just an executory agreement until the 
Court signs off on the agreement. Once the Court has accepted a defendant's 
guilty plea the agreement is analogous to a contract and legally binding agreement 
has been reached. Mr. Dunn could not perform on the contract because of his 
continued incarceration and the prohibitions place on him in his very short stay in 
a half-way house setting. 
The essential elements of contract formation were 
present here. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1985) (indicating that the essential elements of a contract include 
"offer and acceptance, competent parties,_and consideration") The offer 
from the State was that if the defendant will plead guilty to all eleven 
Second Degree Felonies and make restitution the State will allow the 
defendant to withdraw his plea and dismiss the charges. This defendant was 
11 
not able to make the restitution because he could not access the funds while 
incarcerated at Utah State Prison and released shortly to a half-way house. 
Thus, it was impossible for him to perform on the contract. Once the Court 
realized the contemplated plea-bargain was impossible for him to perform, 
he should have allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea and allow him to 
exercise his right to a trial. The defendant attempted, prior to sentencing to 
withdraw his plea but the court denied his request. See Addendum D. 
Wherefore, the appellant requests the court to allow him withdraw 
his plea or extend the timeframe so he can transfer the money back to Mr. 
Waters. 
ISSUE II. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR ALL 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. THE COURT SHOULD NEVER 
ACCEPTED THE PLEA. THE COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY 
WITH RULE 11. 
The Trial Court erred when they accepted the defendant's plea to 
theft by deception. In setting forth a factual basis for the plea the State 
failure to proffer evidence of all the elements of the crime. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
(2) Theft by Deception does not occur, however, when there is only 
falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by 
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statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in 
communications addressed to the public or to a class or group. 
In State v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 262 the court held to commit 
theft by deception, a party must exercise control over another's property by 
means of a deception. The trial judge did not bind the defendant over on the 
charge because the State failed to show any deception on the part of the 
defendant. The Utah Court of appeals affirmed his decision. 
In the current case Mr. Waters gave the defendant some money. See 
Addendum C. Mr. Dunn did not deceive Mr. Waters into giving him the 
money. When Mr. Waters asked for the money back, Mr. Dunn was not 
able to return the money because he was incarcerated. The essential element 
of deception on the part of the defendant is absent based upon the facts 
tendered by the State. 
Mr. Dunn entered an Alford plea to the charges because he did not 
agree to the facts set forth by the State. He plead guilty in order to gain his 
freedom and gain access to the funds and transfer them back to Mr. Waters. 
The court should never have accepted the Alford plea. 
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of 
insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent 
choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution 
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that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted 
unless there is a factual basis for the plea, see, e. g., Griffin v. United 
States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 110, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380, (1968); 
Bruce v. United States, supra, at 342, 379 F.2d at 119 (1967); 
Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969); and 
until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to 
resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of 
innocence. See, e. g, People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308-309, 
206 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1965); State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 563, 
63 S.E. 169, 171 (1908). See also Kreuter v. United States, 
201 F.2d33,36(CA10 1952). 
To satisfy due process rights and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, a trial court must adequately ensure, by way of colloquy 
with the defendant, that he understands all rights waived and retained under 
Rule 11(e) Bluemel v. State, 134 P.3d. 185 (2006). Moreover, to ensure a 
defendant's due process rights, the Utah Supreme Court has held that trial 
courts must strictly comply with the elements of Rule 11(e) See State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). A court's strict compliance with Rule 
11 requires the trial court to establish (1) that "the defendant's guilty plea is 
truly knowing and voluntary," and (2) that athe defendant knowingly waived 
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his constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime." State v. 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, in applying the Rule 
11(e) strict compliance analysis, the factual elements of the charges against a 
defendant must be explained so that the defendant understands and admits 
each element of each offense. Gibbons at 1313. 
The plea affidavit did not contain a recitation of the facts the State 
would rely upon or the elements of the offense(s) to which the Defendant 
was pleading guilty, nor did the Court review the elements of the offense 
during the plea colloquy. The failure to advise the Defendant of the 
elements of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty was error. It was 
also error to fail to advise the Defendant that he had a time-limited right to 
withdraw his plea of guilty in violation of Rule 11(e)(7). 
Rule 11 (e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty 
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found 
there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise 
unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence 
to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
In the Federal courts, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 expressly provides 
that a court "shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless 
it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." North Carolina v. 
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Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct 160 (1970). In the Alford case the state had the 
investigating police officer testify under oath as to the evidence the State 
would rely on if the case were to go to trial. The State had the officer testify 
as to all the elements of the crime to substantiate the guilty plea. In Mr. 
Dunn's case the State set forth some facts, but did not allege these facts in 
sufficient detail as satisfy all the elements of the alleged offense.(see facts 
above). 
It would have been wise for the State to have either Mr. Waters 
testify or the investigating officer testify as to his investigation of the 
actions of Mr. Dunn. This may have created a sufficient record the Mr. 
Dunn somehow committed the crimes with which he was charged. Absent 
such a record the Court can only speculate whether or not a factual basis 
exists for the plea. The State definitely did not set forth the element of 
deception as required under the statue. Therefore the appellant asks this 
court to set aside his plea. 
ISSUE III. THE DEFENDANT'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IS CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per 
curium). This includes the decision to grant or deny probation. See, State v. 
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Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when 
"the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence 
imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1990)(citations and quotations omitted.) Furthermore, an appellate court can 
only find an abuse of discretion 4 If It can be said that no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d at 
909 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). 
The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to 
consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive 
sentence. 
The Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of Theft by Deception 
Second Degree Felonies. The decision of the Trial court to run them 
consecutive constitutes an abuse of discretion.. 
In State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined four mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The 
Court reversed the trial courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences. 
The Supreme Court's reasoning was sound and should be applied in this 
case to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. In Galli, the Supreme 
Court found that the trial courts abused their discretion. "The record shows 
17 
that Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may no have given adequate weight to 
certain mitigating circumstances." Id. at 938. 
In Galli there were four mitigating factors that the trial courts failed to 
consider that caused them to abuse their discretion. All of the four factors 
can be applied favorably to the Defendant's situation. The first factor was 
that Galli had not inflicted physical injuries on his victims. Id. Galli had used 
a gun, but it was a pellet gun that was incapable of inflicting a serious injury. 
Id. In the case at bar, the Defendant pled guilty to property crimes. 
The second factor in Galli was that his criminal history did not 
support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. In the case at bar, the 
Defendant does not have a lengthy criminal record for violence but does 
have a history of writing bad checks and fraud. 
The third factor was that Galli had voluntarily confessed and admitted 
responsibilities for his crimes. "The record suggests that he has expressed a 
commitment and hope to improve himself." Id. In the case of the bar, the 
Defendant stated in the sentencing hearing that he came up with idea of the 
plea bargain so that he could return the money to Mr. Waters. R.107 P 6. 
The fourth and final Galli factor was that consecutive sentences were 
not in accord with Galli's rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed 
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that Galli's conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve 
himself and be a productive law abiding citizen. Id. 
The trial court did not consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs. 
In the sentence given by the trial court there is no mention that the defendant 
could benefit from counseling for theft. R. 107. 
The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by 
the Supreme Court in Galli. The trial court failed to consider these factors, 
and therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to the 
Utah State Prison on consecutive counts. For these reasons, the Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to remand this case back to the trial court so 
he can be re-sentenced. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant would like to transfer the funds back to Mr. Waters but 
he is unable to do so while in custody of the Department of Corrections. He 
is unable to perform his part of the bargain and requests that court grant him 
additional time to do so or allow him to withdraw his plea. 
The trial court did not strictly follow Rule 11. There was not a 
sufficient factual basis given to support the plea. Furthermore, the elements 
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of the crime were not contained in the plea agreement and he was never 
informed of his rights to withdraw his plea. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive 
sentences on the defendant. The Court should have looked at the 
defendant's rehabilative needs. For these reasons the Defendant respectfully 
requests this Court to remand his case back to the trial court to either allow 
his plea to be set aside, given more time to perform on the contract or to be 
re-sentenced. 
A 
DATED this J ? day of February, 2009. 
DAVID M PERRY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071100069 FS 
Judge: CLINT S. JUDKINS 
Date: February 25, 200* 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindac 
Prosecutor: BAIRD, TONY C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 19, 1968 
Video 
DAVID M 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
3. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
4. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
5. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
6. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
7. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
8. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
9. THEFT BY DECEPTION -
Plea: Guilty - Di 
10. THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Plea: Guilty - Di 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
2nd Degree 
sposition: 
- 2nd Degre 
sposition 
Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
: Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
Felony 
05/11/07 
e Felony 
05/11/07 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Paap i 
Case No: 071100069 
Date: Feb 25, 2008 
11. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more. than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison, 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
Pacrp. ?. 
Case No: 071100069 
Date: Feb 25, 2008 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison, 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The 
custody for transportation to the 
defendant.will be confined. 
defendant is remanded to your 
Utah State Prison where the 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Charges 1 through 3 will run consecutive to charges 4 through 7, 
and charges 8 through 11 will run consecutive to those charges. 
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Case No: 0 71100069 
Date: Feb 25, 2 00 8 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1500.00 
$0. 00 
$702.70 
$1500.00 
Charge # Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1500.00 
$0.00 
$702.70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 3 Fine : 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due ; 
$1500.00 
$0.00 
$702 . 70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 4 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1500.00 
$0 . 00 
$702.70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 5 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1500.00 
$0 .00 
$702 .70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 6 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1500.00 
$0.00 
$702 .70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 7 
Charge # 8 
Fine : 
Suspended; 
Surcharge 
Due : 
Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1500.00 
$0. 00 
$702 .10 
$1500 00 
$1500.00 
$0.00 
$702.70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 9 Fine: $1500.00 
Darro A 
Case No: 071100069 
Date: Feb 25, 2008 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$0.00 
$702 . 70 
$1500.00 
Charge # 1 0 Fine: $1500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $702.70 
Due: $1500.00 
Charge # 11 Fine: $1500,00 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$0.00 
$702.70 
$1500.00 
Total Fine: $16500 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $7729.7 
Total Principal Due: $16500 
Plus Interest 
Restitution Amount: $1149175.00 Plus Interest 
Dated this Z ^ T d a y of V~3^> 
tfr't; V, \ '• 
P --'4 § /$ 
0 
CLINT S, J 
District Co1 
KINS 
rt Judge 
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rN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY P. DUNN. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 071100069 
Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
I, Larry D. Dunn, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and 
that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Waiver of Preliminary Hearing 
I understand that I am waiving my right to a preliminary hearing. A preliminary 
hearing is a procedure to determine probable cause and to inform an accused of the 
charges against him or her. Competent evidence which shows probable cause that the 
charged crime was committed and that the defendant committed it is sufficient to hold an 
accused to answer. The evidence does not have to be sufficient for a conviction at trial. 
I understand that at a preliminary hearing, an accused has the right to be 
represented by counsel. If an accused cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to 
represent him or her. 
I understand, that an accused may call and compel witnesses to testify on his or her 
behalf, and confront and cross examine any witnesses the State may call to testify. I 
understand that an accused may testify on his or her behalf, or remain silent and say 
nothing. In order to proceed with my plea today, I waive my preliminary hearing. 
ENT'D MAY 1 4 ?nn7 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Crime & Statutory Provision Degree Minimum Mandatory 
A. Theft by Deception (Eleven Counts) 2nd Felony 1-15 yrs Prison 
$10,000 Fine + 85% surcharge 
1 have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes(s) to which I 
am pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) will are 
as stated in the criminal information filed in this case. See Information on file in this 
case. 
1 understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute 
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my 
guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crimes(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty ( or no contest): The facts are those stated by the prosecutor in open court 
during the plea hearing. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
understand that I might alter, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. I am represented by David Perry. 
I certify that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and 
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty (or 
no contest) pier (s). 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the 
consequences o rmy guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified 
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have 
the opportunity o^ cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance 
and testimony ( f those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, 
the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against 
myself. I also know that if 1 chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could 
not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of 
the charged crimes(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not 
guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a 
jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me 
guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford 
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am 
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty or no contest, I am waiving 
and giving up all the statutory and constitutional right as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, 
or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, includirg any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part 
of a plea agreement. 
Conseci:tive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they 
may run at the ^ame time (concurrently). 1 know that I may be charged an additional fine 
for each crime hat I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting 
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead 
guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty 
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive 
sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a 
plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including 
those explained below: 
A. I agree to plead guilty to the eleven counts of Theft by Deception as charged in 
the Information in the present case, each a second degree felony. 
B. If not already in the possession of my probation/parole officer, I agree to turn 
my passport(s) over to my attorney, David Perry, until this case is concluded. I further 
agree not leave the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from my 
probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case. 
C. I agree to deposit $1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust account of my 
defense attorney, David Perry, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas in this case and 
being released from the Utah State Prison. This money will be paid to Richard Waters to 
compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to me during the years 
of 2004 and 2005 (as outlined in the State's discovery). These monies are the subject of 
the eleven counts in the present case. 
D. The State agrees that upon me entering guilty pleas to the eleven counts 
discussed above, it will stipulate to an own recognisance release for a period of 90 days. 
M W ^ K , +^£hcb ivillioi'>'te clUttui* iU foubjck JPcjnio^ flee h>$ W • 
E. The State further agrees that once it has reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has 
received the $1,300,000.00 in legal funds, it will stipulate to me withdrawing my pleas to 
the eleven counts and the present case will be dismissed. 
Trial Judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are 
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). 
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any 
changes because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am JjL Years of age. I have attended school through the ' V grade. I can 
read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter 
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not 
presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my 
judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any 
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I 
am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I 
understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilt) (or no contest), I will 
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Fost-Conviction Remedies Act in title 78, 
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this / ' Day of. ii 20 D 7 
( yLarry D. Dunn 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant 
above, and that i know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I 
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understand the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly state; and these, along with the 
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, 
are accurate an 1 true. 
/JJt)iw) 
ATTORNEY FOR^DEFENDANT 
David Perry 
Bar No.: 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
, defendant. I have reviewed this 
Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or 
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the 
record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would 
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered 
and that the ace ^ptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Tony C. Baird 
Bar No.: 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court 
witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are 
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
It IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this Li Day of _ \M A^| ., 20_6_^. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 071100069 
) Transcript of Videotape. 
LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Transcript of Entry of Plea. 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Logan, Utah 
May 11, 2007 
1 * * * 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: TONY C. BAIRD 
Deputy County Attorney 
For the Defendant: DAVID M. PERRY 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
B)^7 
J 0 
1 
THE COURT: Let's take the case of State of Utah 
versus Larry Douglas Dunn. This is the time set for a 
pretrial conference. Mr. Perry, obviously your negotiations 
have been successful. WiLl you verbalize for me your 
arrangement, please. 
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, we prepared a written plea 
agreement. In that agreement it sets forth all of the terms. 
The court has the copy. What basically Mr. Dunn is going to 
plead guilty to is the 11 counts. He's going to waive his 
right to a preliminary hearing and plead guilty to the 11 
counts. The state will then release him on his own 
recognizance. We'll waive our right to be sentenced within 
90 days, or within 45 days. And we'll set sentencing in 90 
days . 
During that 90 day time frame Mr. Dunn, if he has a 
passport, will turn it over to me or his probation or parole 
officer. He agrees to deposit $1.3 million in my trust 
account. And this money will be paid to the victim Richard 
Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously 
transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005. 
And they are the monies subject to the 11 counts in the 
present case. 
The state agrees that upon entering the guilty pleas to 
the 11 counts they will stipulate to his own recognizance for 
a period of 90 days. The state further agrees that once it 
2 
has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in 
legal funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing 
his pleas to the 11 counts and the present case will be 
dismissed. 
They've also agreed that if he has any problems with --
he had a parole date last week. The Board should release him 
based upon this agreement. The state has also agreed to 
write a letter to the Board recommending that he be released 
for this time period so he can get these monies together. 
THE COURT: So it's anticipated that with this 
agreement he will be released from the Utah State Prison? 
MR. BAIRD: Yeah. We'll ask the court to make sure 
that there's an OR release in this case, his own recognizance 
release. 
THE COURT: What is he in prison for now? 
MR. BAIRD: A bad check, I think, a bad check 
offense. 
THE COURT: Out of which court? 
MR. BAIRD: Salt Lake. 
MR. PERRY: Third District. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you understand and realize 
that if the court approves this thing here today and I 
release you on your own recognizance on this case, I don't 
have any control over whatever that other case is down at the 
prison? 
3 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. I'm still on parole 
until 2027. 
THE COURT: But you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: The state is comfortable that he will be 
released and can follow through on this arrangement that has 
been made. 
Mr. Dunn, you've been incarcerated, but have you consumed 
any alcohol or drugs before coming in here today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not drugs, but I take medications. 
And they're nonpsychotropic. 
THE COURT: Those medications that you are taking do 
not affect your ability to make a reasoned decision right 
now; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: They don't. 
THE COURT: Do you feel you've had ample opportunity 
to discuss this matter with your attorney, Mr. Perry? 
THE DEFENDANT: Very much so. 
THE COURT: Do you feel that you understand what is 
going on here today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Very well, yes. 
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you or threatened 
you with anything to get you to plead guilty to these 11 
counts other than as set forth in this document or 
represented to the court by your attorney? 
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THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand that any recommendation 
made to me as to what sentence you should receive would be a 
recommendation only and I may or may not accept the 
recommendation, do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: After I've done X, Y and Z you still 
would have the authority to not dismiss the case? 
THE COURT: That's correct. I'm inclined to do 
that, but you need to understand that these are all 
recommendations, everything that has been said. I can see no 
reason at this point in time -- I understand that this is a 
result of much negotiation, et cetera, that has gone on and 
the court in all probability would follow through on that. 
But you need to understand that I have the last word and if I 
get additional information I may do something different. You 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. Has the defendant waived his 
preliminary hearing? 
MR. PERRY: No, Your Honor. 
MR. BAIRD: No. He needs to do that. 
THE COURT: You understand that this statement of 
defendant sets forth the rights you have as relates to a 
preliminary hearing? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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THE COURT: And the purpose of a preliminary hearing 
is to ascertain whether or not the state can show that 
there's probable cause 
charged with were commi 
committed those. This 
this document you give 
hearing, you understanc 
THE DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: Tb 
signature. You signed 
that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: 
to believe that the offenses you were 
.tted and you were the person who 
sets forth those rights. By signing 
up your right to that preliminary 
I that? 
Yes, sir. 
is document does appear to bear your 
this before it was submitted to me; is 
Immediately, right now. J 
THE COURT: Very well. The counts that I understand 
you will be pleading guilty to are all second degree 
felonies. They appear 
read count one. Theft 
in violation of Utah Co 
to all be theft by deception. I'll 
by deception, a second degree felony, 
de Annotated section 76-6-405. The 
information alleges that the defendant did, on or about May 
18th, 2004, obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of another by 
the owner thereof. The 
or exceeded $5000. Or 
person of another. 
Count two is exactl 
date there is July 16th 
deception with the purpose to deprive 
value of the property or services was 
the property was stolen from the J 
y the same as the first, except the J 
, 2004. Count three is the same as 
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count two, including the date. As is count four and count 
five is the same. Count six is the same as those previously 
described except the date there is July 26th, 2004. Count 
seven is also the same, theft by deception. The date there 
is January 20th of 2005. Count eight is the same as 
previously set forth, except the date is January 21st, 2005. 
Count nine is the same, except the date is January -- excuse 
me, July 23rd, 2005. Count ten is theft by deception as 
previously described, with the date being August 8th, 2005. 
And count 11 is, again, theft by deception, the same as 
previously described, except the date is January 6th, 2006. 
To those 11 counts, Mr. Dunn, how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I make a suggestion? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: What's the date on the first one? 
THE COURT: The date on the first one is May 18th, 
2004. 
THE DEFENDANT: You might want to have me plead 
guilty -- you said the first one, have me just do the second 
ones. I was incarcerated then. It's just a matter of dates. 
I was incarcerated at that time. I'm pleading guilty to all 
of them, but --
MR. BAIRD: It's on or about. 
THE DEFENDANT: I still plead guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. To those 11 counts how do 
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1 you plead? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Baird, give us the factual basis for 
4 the 11 counts. 
5 MR. BAIRD: On the dates -- on or about the dates 
6 alleged in the information, from a source here in Cache 
7 County, state of Utah, Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies 
8 J from here to accounts under the control of Mr. Dunn. Each 
9 one of these transfers was in excess of $5,000. 
10 I Mr. Waters, if called to testify, would testify that 
11 J these monies were transferred for a specific purpose. And 
12 J that these monies were received by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Dunn 
13 acknowledged that he received these amounts. 
14 That subsequently, some several months later, Mr. Waters 
15 demanded that the defendant give the monies back and the 
16 defendant has not returned those funds. The state would 
17 present evidence that these funds were used inconsistently --
18 inconsistent to the purpose that they were given to Mr. Dunn 
19 for. Thus Mr. Dunn exercised unauthorized control over the 
20 I funds. Along with the other elements, those are the facts 
21 that we would prove. 
22 THE COURT: When you indicate to us, Mr. Baird, that 
23 the money was used for other purposes than what was 
24 originally designated by Mr. Waters, apparently that was for 
25 the purpose of depriving Mr. Waters of the benefit of that 
money; is that correct? Is that what you're maintaining? 
MR. BAIRD: When the money was used inconsistent for 
the purpose for which Mr. Waters gave it to Mr. Dunn, and 
then subsequently not returning the money, refusing to return 
it, it shows an intent to permanently deprive -- there were 
several demands made. Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of 
these facts, but this is the evidence we would present, that 
the money was given to him for, among other things, a 
business venture and some other things. But in any event the 
monies -- the state would present evidence, bank records, to 
show that the monies were used inconsistent for the purpose 
for which it was given to him. 
THE COURT: And that Mr. Waters was deprived of the 
money? 
MR. BAIRD: Yes. He's never received the money 
back. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you've heard the facts as 
related to us by Mr. Baird. Are you pleading guilty because 
you committed the offenses as he described them? 
MR. PERRY: I don't think he would agree to that. 
Maybe we might have to do it on an Alford basis. He's 
pleading guilty to get out of jail. The reason he couldn't 
get the money back once the demand was made was his probation 
officer -- his probation got violated down in Salt Lake 
County and he got incarcerated so he wasn't able to access 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 the money. 
MR. BAIRD: We would agree to an Alford type plea. 
1 I understand Mr. Dunn may not agree with 
representations that the state has 
J the evidence we would present. We 
and whatnot to show that the money 
I think Mr. Dunn realizes that 
here. He understands that this is 
this, to make this arrangement. Sc 
resolving it and looking at the lik 
weighing all those sorts of things, 
1 that this is in his best interest. 
our conversations. Is that right, 
is in your best interest? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, the 
made . 
would 
all of the 
Nonetheless, that's 
present bank records 
was used inconsistently. 
there' 
in his 
s some give and take 
best interest to do 
> I think for purposes of 
.elihoc d of conviction and 
I think that he believes 
At least I think so from 
Mr. Du 
court 
guilty plea to something unless somebody 
offense and you're telling me you d 
But there's an exception to that an 
we call an Alford type plea. That 
idn' t 
d that 
nn, you believe this 
can't accept a 1 
committed the I 
commit the offense. 
exception is what 
is where, after J 
consultation with your attorney, you have 
is in your best interest to accept 
state has proposed because you thin 
your chances of being convicted are 
off to take this plea. Is that wha 
-
the pi 
k if y 
such 
t you ' 
determined that it 
ea bargain that the 
ou went to trial 
that you're better 
re telling me here 
10 
in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. The court will accept the 
plea, designating it as an Alford type plea. But I need to 
assure you that in doing that, if you don't follow through on 
this arrangement and it becomes necessary for this court to 
pass sentence, you are sentenced the same as if you admitted 
you performed the acts. The court will accept it as a guilty 
plea, you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. The court will accept and 
designate it as an Alford type plea. I will sign the order 
containing the statement of defendant and incorporate that 
into the record. Pursuant to your agreement, the court will 
authorize the defendant's release on his own recognizance 
pursuant to the terms and conditions in the statement of 
defendant. 
Counsel, how are we going to review this? How do you 
want to handle that? 
MR. PERRY: Set it for a sentencing date in 90 days, 
I guess. 
THE COURT: Set it for sentencing, is that what you 
want to do? I guess there's no need for a PSI in this case. 
Who is going to report back to the court if he's performed 
all of the obligations? 
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MR. BAIRD: We will. I guess, frankly, what we 
probably ought to do, because otherwise he'll have to be 
referred to AP&P for a statement and that sort of thing. I 
would suggest that we set it for a status hearing 90 days 
out, 90 days from this coming Monday. And then at that time 
we'll know whether everything has been fulfilled. If not, I 
guess set it for sentencing. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Ask your attorney and he can bring it to 
my attention. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. PERRY: His question was if he has the money 
sooner than 90 days can we come back before the court and 
have this dismissed. My answer was I'm sure the state 
wouldn't oppose a dismissal if the money is returned. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, we handle routine matters 
every Monday. If you get this thing taken care of before 
that, notify your attorney. Mr. Perry knows how to put it on 
the next Monday's calendar. 
All right. We'll schedule it for the 20th of August at 
ten. The court will designate that as a status conference. 
I'll expect the parties to come prepared at that time to 
represent to me whether or not -- in as much as we don't have 
AP&P or someone monitoring it, the attorneys will have to be 
prepared to come and tell me what the status of the case is 
12 
that day. 
All right. Have we covered all of the bases? 
MR. PERRY: I did say this earlier on the record, 
but, Mr. Dunn, are you willing to waive your right to be 
sentenced within 45 days? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: I appreciate that Mr. Perry. Anything 
else that we should take care of? 
MR. PERRY: Nothing that I have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, have we covered everything in 
this matter? 
MR. BAIRD: I believe so, yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 13, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache 
County, Logan, Utah. 
Dated this 5th day of September, 2008. 
B-JJLL^-
Rodney M. (Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R, 
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THE COURT: Let's take State versus Larry Douglas 
Dunn. Mr. Perry, I show that this is the time set for 
sentencing on 11 counts, all theft by deception, all second 
degree felonies. Any reason why sentence should not be 
passed at this time? 
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, I think this is a case that 
we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to see if he's 
competent to proceed. I'll file the petition and ask the 
court to stay sentencing until the state can look at him and 
see if he understood what he was doing when he entered his 
plea or not. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask for an attorney that would 
vigorously defend me? I deserve that whether I'm guilty or 
not. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, input from the state on Mr. 
Perry's motion? 
MR. BAIRD: May we approach? 
THE COURT: Come forward. 
(Sidebar, not recorded.) 
THE COURT: The court has had an opportunity to 
visit with counsel at the bench. Mr. Perry, anything 
further? 
MR. PERRY: Mr. Dunn needs a few minutes to read the 
presentence report. I haven't talked to him since he was 
here last. 
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THE COURT: You've had ample opportunity to visit 
with him. It's time to proceed. 
MR. PERRY: I make a motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas that he entered. 
THE COURT: The motion will need to be made in 
writing. You can do that at a later time. 
MR. PERRY: We object to proceeding with sentencing 
at this time because in order for him to -- once he's 
sentenced he's not able to withdraw his plea. So we'd like 
to make a motion prior to sentencing to see if the plea can 
be withdrawn. I want to supplement that by having him 
examined by two examiners at the state hospital to see if he 
was competent at the time he entered his plea. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, the court has heard your 
comments at the bench, but I'll hear what you have to say on 
the record. 
MR. BAIRD: We oppose that. We'd like to go ahead 
with sentencing today. If counsel wants to file a motion at 
a later time, we'll respond to it then. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Perry? 
MR. PERRY: We object to proceeding with sentencing 
today because we've made -- we want to make a petition to 
determine whether he's competent to proceed. Once we make 
that petition, Your Honor, as you well know that stays all 
proceedings. So we can't proceed with anything further until 
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that issue is resolved, unless you want to have a hearing to 
see whether the petition is valid. That still stays all 
proceedings. 
I make that petition at this time in behalf of Mr. Dunn 
to stay all proceedings so that we can determine whether he 
was competent at the time he entered his plea and whether his 
plea should be withdrawn or not. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, this matter has been pending 
for I'm not sure how long. The court finds that your motions 
are untimely. I'll allow you to file those in writing if you 
so desire, but the court will proceed with sentencing today. 
Anything else you'd like to place on the record? 
MR. PERRY: Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where 
he was hopeful that he could get out of prison and get over 
to the Isle Mann where he's indicated he has the one point 
three million dollars to pay Mr. Waters. He was unable to 
get out of prison and get access to these funds in order to 
pay the restitution to Mr. Waters. 
Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get 
access to this money, he has not had the benefit of the 
bargain that was entered into in this case. That being that 
once he paid the 1.3 million the state would stipulate to him 
being able to withdraw his plea and the charges be dismissed. 
Because of his inability to have access to this money that's 
in the Isle Mann, an off shore trust, because of his 
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incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution. 
Had he been able to make restitution we wouldn't be 
proceeding with sentencing today and the charges would be 
dismissed. 
Mr. Dunn is confident that he has that money there. He 
believes the money is there. He just needs to be able to 
access the money and then Mr. Waters can be made whole. By 
sentencing him to prison it will delay that. And plus it 
will -- he may be in prison a long time. He pled straight up 
to the charges with the understanding that he thought he 
would be able to get out of prison and get the money. The 
state wrote a letter and tried to help him in that matter. 
Because of different factors he's been unable to -- he 
was released to a halfway house, but they would not allow him 
telephone access or any type of pass to be able to access 
this money. Therefore he's still in prison. I believe he 
has a Board date, or maybe not. 
THE DEFENDANT: I went to the Board. 
MR. PERRY: You went to the Board and don't have a 
date? 
THE DEFENDANT: The Board said I needed to figure 
out this second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you 
about yet. Then go back and tell them what happened. 
They're pending right now posing you a question, but I 
haven't even spoken to my attorney. 
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THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PERRY: Anything you want to say to the Judge9 
This is the time for sentencing, Mr. Dunn. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, input from the state? 
MR. BAIRD: I think the report done by the AP&P 
agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent. I thought he did a 
great job of explaining what Mr. Dunn is all about. Mr. Dunn 
is a complete fraud and he continues to try to -- even today 
it's continually a fraud. He's unlike many defendants, or 
any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted. I think Mr. 
Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate. I ask the 
court to sentence the defendant to prison. I'll submit it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I say something, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I came up with this idea. I asked 
originally for a pow wow to all get together so the 
prosecution could see that Richard was all on board and 
understanding. The prosecution saw that. Mr. Baird listened 
to Richard, what he said. Everything that I've said is 
exactly one line linear after the next. 
I said that this deal had to be done before May 8th. The 
prison did not transport me on -- was it the 5th? The Friday 
beforehand I had court here and for no reason at all the 
prison didn't transport me. Your assistant sent it in, maybe 
this lady here sent it m , but I wasn't transported. 
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The deal needed to be done before May 8th is what the 
Board said and then I would be released on May 8th last year. 
It wasn't done before May 8th. I came actually on Friday, a 
week after -- four days after I was to be released. So now I 
lost that May 8th Board date. I even said to you on that 
date, and it's on the video or the transcript, I said I could 
be another three to six months before I get released. 
I come back and meet with you and I was still cheery. I 
said to you I've seen the Board, they told me I'd be released 
July 31st, but it's now August 20th. Clearly something is 
arrears. 
I went back and my captain, Hughes, who doesn't like 
inmates, threatened me saying if I'm not telling the truth 
I'd go to max. He took me at my word and called the Board. 
The Board lost my file. They said that they misplaced it. 
They misplaced it during the summer time, whatever happened. 
They said we'll get right on it. It wasn't done. I finally 
wrote to Deputy Warden Bouseo and asked for his help. And I 
contacted Officer Valdez, our caseworker. They called the 
Board and a Ms. Cheryl, and I don't know if that's Ms. Cheryl 
Hansen or not, but a Ms. Cheryl said, oh, my gosh, and I 
heard, it was on the speaker phone, this deal isn't done yet. 
If I can find a Board member it will be done by this 
afternoon. And the next day I had my Board date for the 
13th. 
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Now, the next mess up -- I haven1 
yet. Everybody keeps saying I'm such 
t done anything wrong 
a bad person, but I 
never get to perform. My dad gets involved because I had to 
have another angiogram. I don't know 
Mr. Baird, but I got emails in my poc 
if he got involved with 
<et that these gentlemen 
brought up, that my dad sent around saying junior needs to be 
watched, make sure he's taking his bl 
angiogram. 
Dod, everything for the 
I got sent to a halfway house which I never asked to go. 
The Board actually, when I went to th< 
went to the halfway house. They said 
there. I didn't ask to go there. At 
em, they didn't know I'd 
why did you ask to go 
a halfway house it's 
like still being in prison, but you can get your own food and 
stuff like that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, I have 
to be taken care of. 
THE DEFENDANT: But you need 
was mixed up. 
other matters that need 
to knowing everything 
THE COURT: Make your comments relevant to --
THE DEFENDANT: These are re 
exactnesses. Now I get to the halfwa; 
can't come to court unless I receive < 
morning time. I called every morning 
faxed something down. My boss brings 
now have a $20,000 bail. I come back 
levant. These are 
/ house and they say I 
a. fax from you in the 
that morning and they 
me up and I see you. I 
I don't run away. 
They had seven men run away from the halfway house. 
I'm trying to resolve this. If I go to prison right now 
Mr. Waters won't get his money. I've been in prison right 
now not because I've done another crime or something, but 
because of this. 
His attorney, Mr. Brown, this is very important, these 
are exacts, went to my agent. They called the judge and said 
I'm a bad person, let's send him to prison on this stuff 
right here. So I've served two years on something I should 
never have done in the beginning. Richard and I should have 
sat down and got it worked out instead of him going to my 
parole agent. Now I'm here facing 11 felony twos. I gave 
you the opportunity to hang me if I didn't perform, but I've 
never performed. 
Moreover, the court attorney, I haven't even seen this --
what is this called? -- the PSI. I haven't even seen the PSI 
yet. But PSI agent at the hearing -- the attorney at the 
hearing, Manny Garcia, said this isn't even acceptable to the 
court because Mr. Feltenberger lied to the Board and 
misrepresented stuff that we've already defended before the 
Board and that they threw out. So this actually isn't even 
admissible in your court upon some law that they said. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you have another 30 seconds. 
Finish it up. 
THE DEFENDANT: So you want to resolve this and I 
9 
want to resolve this. I thought m the beginning when I met 
you you signed on this as being a good deal. Everybody keeps 
saying I'm such a bad guy. When do I get to perform? I've 
been incarcerated now for two years on something I didn't do, 
this right here. An Alford plea where I say I'm not guilty, 
but the other guy says I am, so we figure out a way to 
resolve it. If you want to resolve it -- I don't need 
anybody to determine if I'm crazy. I invented this little 
plan here. So why are you sentencing me -- to take it out of 
the Board's hands and sentencing me to probation for the same 
90 days when I'm released from prison? 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Dunn, your 30 seconds is 
up. Anything further, Mr. Perry? 
MR. PERRY: I just wonder if the court would 
continue this for like an hour setting to hear all of the 
facts? 
THE COURT: No, counsel. This thing has gone on and 
on and talking about fairy tales. All of his life hefs been 
able to dupe people into things like this. 
THE DEFENDANT: Name one thing where I've messed up. 
THE COURT: That's enough, Mr. Dunn. This court 
isn't going to be provoked any further. Counsel, if you have 
motions to file, file them. You could have filed those in 
the past and you didn't. Mr. Dunn has all of these big 
stories that he'd like everybody to believe. He's done that 
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all his life. This court won't be manipulated further. Mr. 
Waters isn't going to get his money. He keeps trying to 
dangle that as a carrot. If he had any money that he wanted 
to give Mr. Waters he could have done that in the past. We 
tried that and it didn't work. 
Anything further? 
MR. PERRY: Ask the court to at least run them 
concurrent. 
THE COURT: It will be ordered that the defendant on 
the 11 counts serve not less than one nor more than 15 years 
in the Utah State Penitentiary. On each count he's to pay a 
fine in the amount of $1500. Pay restitution in the amount 
of $1,149,175, plus interest. 
The court will run counts one through three 
consecutively. Counts four through seven consecutively and 
counts eight through 11 consecutively. Very well. That will 
be the order of the court. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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